Forrest's Analysis of "Lifeboat Ethics"

Forrest Lamb
Professor Spencer
Writing 150/H
7 November 2011

It is difficult to live in the world’s wealthiest nation and not think, from time to time, about shunning the poor. This is probably true of all Americans, but most of all for those who are upper-class. In “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case against Helping the Poor,” Garrett Hardin ineffectively uses hyperbole, juxtaposition, and repetitive negative connotation, dissuading his upper-class American audience from his view that only by refusing to share their resources with the poor can wealthier people avoid bringing both rich and poor to a state of inevitable ruin.

Hardin uses hyperbole when describing the disastrous consequences that would come to a world in which the rich share freely with the poor. He presents a scenario in which the population of the U.S. pools its resources with an equal number of people from poorer countries around the world. Correctly figuring that, were both populations to maintain their current rate of growth for eighty-seven years, the poorer people would soon be eight times as many as the rich, he concludes that, “Each American would have to share the available resource with eight other people. ” However, this assumes that the Americans would pool in all of their resources while the poorer countries contribute nothing, an unlikely eventuality. It also implies that the poorer population, after gaining some portion of wealth over eighty-seven years, would never increase their productivity and therefore their contribution to the resource pool. The educated American recognizes these exaggerations, and is led to question the validity of Hardin’s predictions.

Once more Hardin describes with hyperbole the state of the world, were wealth to be distributed equitably among all people. To so divide wealth, he maintains, “would guarantee…a ruined world.” This condemning claim leaves the upper-class American thinking, “Is there really no middle ground?” That is, “Can my own charitable actions really guarantee the end of our world?” Certainly this is not the case. No matter one’s actions, one cannot expect they will ensure that the world be utterly destroyed. This readily-apparent overstatement forces the reader to begin to take Hardin’s words with a grain of salt.

Hardin’s use of juxtaposition diminishes his audience’s willingness to accept his argument against helping the poor. He provides a quote to compare “the spread of humanity over the surface of the earth to the spread of cancer in the human body.” He quotes, “cancerous growths demand food; but, as far as I know, they have never been cured by getting it,” likening in a very personal manner those in poverty to the mutated growths of a deadly disease, one that American society views as totally evil for the very reason that it brings people to harm. This harsh description of another human being not only goes against an American’s ingrained sense of human equality, but further makes them more defensive of the poor, and in turn more sympathetic to their situation and needs.

Furthermore, Hardin reinforces the pointlessness of sharing resources through the juxtaposition of humans and cattle. “A farmer,” he asserts, “will allow no more cattle in a pasture than its carrying capacity justifies.” Though this may well be true, are we to ignore the capacity of man to do much more than a cow raised for the slaughter, wasting away its days as it grows fat on the land another has provided? Americans, especially in the upper-class, are more aware of human potential than most and can easily see the limitations of such a comparison. What’s more, the wealthy American upper-class are not likely flattered to be compared to their food. This parasitic portrayal of human-kind leaves the audience uncomfortable and defensive.

Lastly, Hardin consistently employs strong negative connotations to portray the possible viewpoints of those in opposition to his argument as unhelpfully antagonistic. This consistent, unrelenting and one-sided attack on his opponent leaves room only for sympathy toward them. He suggests that those who oppose his view on U.S. immigration policy charge his side with “bigotry” and “chauvinism,” averting participants of the debate from its true topic. He states, “all charges of bigotry and chauvinism [are] irrelevant.” This off-topic discussion of the flaws of his opponents, without reference to any possible degree a validity in their arguments deepens the audience’s sympathy toward them.

Also, in response to a hypothetical liberal’s question of why in situations of emergency the poor must suffer through events that their governments could have prevented, he replies, “The concept of blame is simply not relevant.” This cool statement makes it seem as though liberals are straying from the issue at hand to blame others unnecessarily, when instead they are arguing the innocence of the poor. Even this subtle, though obviously false assertion that liberals are unnecessarily placing blame on others, in conjunction with his generally abundant use of negative connotations serves to further overwhelm a person’s ability to find fault with Hardin’s opposition.

Upon noticing this trend toward negative descriptions of Hardin’s opposition, the reader wonders if the opposing party might be somewhat better than Hardin makes them out to be and begins to regard them more favorably.

Hardin’s ineffective use of hyperbole, juxtaposition, and repetitive negative connotations, from the standpoint of his upper-class American audience, discredit his argument that the wealthy must not share their resources with the poor in order to save the world state of utter ruin. He advocates shunning the poor, but makes his audience feel highly uncomfortable about doing so. Perhaps those wealthy Americans who read, “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case against Helping the Poor,” will find themselves inclined to do just that.